Revisiting the Political Economy of the Rise and Fall of the Unidad Popular (1970-1973)
Date:
Conference presentation at VII National Economic History Congress (CNHE), Vina del Mar, Chile
The talk reinterprets the rise and collapse of Chile’s Unidad Popular (1970–1973) as a critical conjuncture shaped by global and local dynamics. Combining social and global historiography with historical political economy, it argues that a peripheral, hierarchical position constrained domestic development. After surveying major interpretations (neoliberal, neo-structuralist, institutional, dependency), the paper advances a causal hypothesis: shocks to U.S. capacity utilization—instrumented by the accumulation rate of defense assets—affected Chile’s terms of trade. Using local projections with an instrumental variable, the estimated impulse responses are positive in 1965–1966, fade and turn negative by 1968, and collapse by roughly 70 percent in 1973, consistent with a balance-of-payments crisis; 1974–1978 shows high volatility. The contribution integrates historiography and causal methods to foreground external constraint and unintended effects of U.S. “military Keynesianism.”
Note: Originally presented in Spanish.
